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Uses of the past: History as a resource for the present 
Constance de Saint-Laurent, University of Bologna & Swiss National Science 
Foundation & Sandra Obradović, London School of Economics.  
 
Introduction 
Research on collective memory – exploring the lay representations of history – has been 
booming in the past decades, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this 
context, the past has started to be seen as not only interesting in itself, but as especially 
relevant to understand the present, as it shapes our relations with other groups by defining 
who we are, to use terms common in collective memory research. The past is thus given 
authority over the present (and often the future), by assuming that its transformations and 
deformations play a determining role in the way we understand ourselves and act with 
others, as members of social groups.  
Indeed, the power of history, as a resource for the present, has been illustrated time and 
time again both rather explicitly and in more subtle ways. At one end of the spectrum 
feature the words of many politicians, who have spoken about their countries links to the 
past, their fears of letting history repeat itself, or their promises of bringing a glorious 
past back again. The current rise of nationalist discourses, both in Europe and in the 
United States, has often been supported by calls to revive idealised national pasts or to 
protect cultural identities rooted in national myths. At the other end of the spectrum, one 
can find a plethora of institutionalized historical narratives and symbols, which tell us 
something not only about what happened in the past, but how we should remember it, and 
what has been conveniently forgotten. In this special issue, we propose to look, on the 
contrary, at how the past is transformed and mobilised for the present. That is, we would 
like to explore how it is mobilised and brought to the present, as a resource to give 
meaning to present actions and groups as well as to imagine collective futures. The 
contributions to this special issue thus focus on how history serves as a powerful resource 
to shape not only collective memory, but disciplinary developments, national politics and 
resistance to legitimized narratives of the past.  
While there has been much research on the links between collective memory, 
representations of history and the present, there have been less attempts to provide a 
theoretical perspective on how history becomes a resource – simply assuming that it is 
one. A few important points can perhaps explain the lack of theoretical development in 
comparison to the empirical output. Firstly, it has for a long time been popular wisdom 
that the past shapes the present, epitomized in the popular words of philosopher George 
Santayana; “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” In other 
words, there is something powerful to be learned from the past, and that it is significant 
   
 
   
 
for making sense of, and shaping action within, the present. This common-sensical 
knowledge has no doubt shaped scholarly thinking as well, becoming an important 
assumption influencing research on collective memory or representations of history (see 
Tomicic & Berardi, this issue, and Leone, this issue), leading to a less carefully 
unpacking of its theoretical elements. 
 
This is not to say that research on the collective memory has not theorised the links 
between past and present, but rather that researchers have not always been very explicit 
about the processes by which history is used as a resource for the present. Yet, the various 
conceptions of collective memory that can be found in the literature are not devoid of 
theoretical implications in this regard – and it perhaps explains why many researchers 
have not found it necessary to dwell on the issue. In this paper, we thus propose to review 
three key ways in which collective memory, or social representations of history, has been 
understood in psychology, and what their consequences are for how we understand the 
relations between past and present. After looking at collective memory as social thinking, 
as social identity and as a process of sense-making, we propose a more general 
framework for understanding how history is used as a resource for the present, arguing 
that collective memory transforms and is transformed by the present, and that it is, 
ultimately, prospective.  
History as social thinking  
One important way in which collective memory has been conceptualised in psychology is 
as a form of social thinking, that is a way to understand the social world in which we live. 
Indeed, collective memory participates to how we represent the social groups we belong 
to and the ones of others, as well as how we think about social relations in general – by 
providing examples of how these have taken place in the past.  While it is a vast field of 
research, most of the scholarship that has conceptualised collective memory as a form of 
social thinking has done so by using two different approaches: social representation 
theory and discursive psychology.  
History as a social representation 
Social representation theory explores how we make sense of the world through both 
constructing it and existing within it. It is a theory of meaning-making, power and social 
change (Elcheroth et al., 2011; Howarth, 2006; Moscovici, 2000) that asks the question 
of how the unfamiliar becomes familiar. The interest in understanding how novel ideas, 
objects and events become familiarized and integrated into our common sense knowledge 
is at the heart of the theory. It highlights the shared, dynamic, and at times contradictory 
nature of social knowledge by defining social representations as systems of shared 
   
 
   
 
values, ideas and practices that enable people to orient themselves in their material and 
social world (Moscovici, 2000).   
In recent years, the study of social representations has turned to explore social 
representations of history and their role in shaping public discourse on change, in-group 
identities and attitudes towards intergroup relations, and intergroup conflicts (Liu & 
Hilton, 2005; Obradović, 2017). This research has focused on exploring the more 
collaborative ways in which history is remembered, or forgotten, and the consequences it 
has for the present, while also drawing on the theoretical distinction made between reified 
and lay knowledge, and applying it to how we remember history. In essence, the contrast 
between reified and lay knowledge emphasizes the difference between institutionally 
produced accounts of history, often rooted in political agendas or ideological camps, and 
knowledge which interlinks personal experience with common-sense ideas produced 
through social interactions (Andreouli & Howarth, 2013). In addition, while the former 
might have the power to develop what is known as hegemonic, or dominant, 
representations of history, the latter often provide contexts in which these are discussed 
and contested. As Augoustinos and Penny (2001) illustrate for example, the top-down 
framing of certain socio-political agendas and the bottom-up contestation or acceptance 
of these representations often become inextricably related to larger discourses around 
how the past is remembered and the meaning of an in-group identity, such as that of a 
national identity.  
Research on social representations of history has explored issues ranging from whether 
there is a hegemonic representation of world history (Liu et al., 2005) to how historical 
representations can be used to construct coherent narratives about communities that 
inhibit seemingly incompatible characteristics (Jovchelovitch, 2012). A key insight from 
this field of study is that history, or representations of history, are utilized to make sense 
of new events and ideas in society, by either linking them to the past, or distinguishing 
them from it (see Obradović, this issue). In other word, the concept of anchoring, 
proposed by Moscovici, becomes useful in understanding how new events in the present, 
which are unfamiliar or strange, are made sense of by being ‘anchored’ or paralleled to 
events of the past. Nicholson’s (2016) study on the historical narratives of Israelis and 
Palestinians living in the UK illustrates the creative ways in which representations of the 
past continue to be relevant in the present, and provide support for political views in the 
present, through the process of anchoring and objectification. Nicholson (2016, p.10) 
argues that these narratives of the past “take their cue from the social representations that 
are anchored and communicated within the informal and social narratives of the 
individual, as well as by formal discourse through the media, education, and 
social/political institutions.” Consequently, as a type of social representation, history 
becomes a resource in the present by allowing us to make sense of novelty but also in 
strategically aligning chosen representations of the past with political agendas. Thus, a 
   
 
   
 
key feature of this theory is an emphasis on communication in creating, disseminating 
and challenging representations of the past. As Klein & Licata (2003) illustrate, 
mobilizing actors such as political leaders can flexibly communicate the past in different 
ways depending on the audience listening, and thus represent their agendas as aligned 
with the historical narrative of different groups.  
History as discourse 
Another important way in which collective memory has been understood as social 
thinking has been to conceptualise it as a form of discourse. And actually, social 
representation theory and discursive psychology have often been seen by their tenants as 
opposing theories: While the idea of social representation implies that there is something 
mental (a representation) that is shared between people (it’s ‘social’ part), discursive 
approaches have argued that collective memory is a social construction done in 
discourses (see de Saint-Laurent, 2018a, for a summary of the debate). For the latter 
perspective, then, there is no pre-existing shared representation, but a series of socially 
and culturally shared practices around how to talk about past, and through which it is 
constructed in present interactions (e.g., Middleton & Brown, 2005).  
Discursive psychology has its foundations in two main theories. First, in Austin’s idea of 
Speech Act (Austin, 1975), that proposed to consider speech as a form of action: saying 
something is neither describing reality or a mental state, but performing a social action. In 
the case of collective memory, talking about history is not a reflexion of an internal 
representation or the reproduction of what actually happened, but an action performed in 
discourse to achieve something, such as convincing the other (for instance that one’s 
country is superior) or creating a sense of shared reality (by restating what one assumes 
to be shared). For this reason, discursive psychologists who study collective memory 
have preferred the term of ‘collective remembering’ (e.g., Middleton & Edwards, 1990), 
in order to reflect the fact that the psychological processes they are interested in are the 
discourses in themselves and how they are acted, and not the assumed underlying mental 
representations or schemas.  Second, discursive psychology has its roots the works of 
Berger & Luckmann (1966) on the social construction of reality, who where interested in 
the social construction of knowledge and how it builds social reality. From this 
perspective, thus, discourses are not a reflection of reality but are how it is constructed. 
Discourses on history, then, follow social and cultural norms of practice – defining what 
can ‘count’ as memory – to construct the past in specific ways.  
Thus, from a discursive perspective discourses on history are social performances enacted 
to achieve specific aims. The very raison d’être of collective memory, then, is its links 
with the present, where it is used to argue, convince, or share with others certain ideas 
about the past and their consequences for the present. It also entails “approaching 
remembering and forgetting as public, social activities where individual experience is 
necessarily mediated by collective experience” (Middleton & Brown, 2007, p.661). 
   
 
   
 
Because of this, it has been particularly sensitive to issues of power – who has the right to 
impose certain discourses and practices – and to the tension between discourses. Indeed, 
it is because others can and do defend versions of the past that are different from ours that 
it is worth discussing it: without alternatives, there would be no need to perform the past.  
Interestingly, this an idea common to both social representation theory and discursive 
psychology. Indeed, in ideological dilemmas, Billig (1998), a prominent discursive 
psychologist, argued that conflicting beliefs and tensions in thinking enable, rather than 
inhibit, dialogue and social action. Echoing this, Markova (2000; 2003) – advocate of a 
dialogical understanding of social representation theory – considers thinking as 
characterized by antinomies, or opposites, which shape how we make sense of the world. 
The common antinomy of ‘us/them’ allows us to structure the social world into categories 
of those who are part of our in-groups, and thus share a history with us, and those who 
are not, and thus are seen to be different. In other words, key to this area of research is a 
conceptualization of human thinking, and knowledge, as inherently built on, and 
structured around, contrasts and opposites. 
History as a form of discourse also emphasizes the extent to which, for most parts of 
human history, the past has been narrated through communicative acts, through story 
telling and myths. This is an idea shared by many approaches to collective memory. The 
development of modern societies and the written record, Liu and Hilton (2005) argue, 
created the possibility for more hegemonic discourses on history to emerge, as written 
accounts allowed for inconsistencies between stories to be addressed, and potentially 
challenged. The institutionalization of an ‘approved version’ of history also conferred a 
newfound power on those able to construct the past in a way that either supported, or 
legitimized, their goals. As Wilmer (2002) argues, “historical narratives, as a consequence 
of publicizing education, have become instruments of political agency […] [they] are 
routinely appropriated to legitimate political acts” (p.80-81; Alonso, 1988). As a 
consequence, examples of historical revisionism, of the re-telling of history, as 
exemplified in Da Silva and Ferreira’s article in this issue, leads us to ask, as Berkhofer 
(1995, p.8) did “[m]ust a history ultimately support or oppose the existing social, 
economic, and political order?” In attempting to answer this question we must move from 
considering how history functions as a discourse about the past, and the present, to how it 
functions to construct and uphold certain social realities, identities and intergroup 
relations.  
History as identity  
Another area of research where history has been explored as an important resource is 
within the literature on social, or collective identities. A key theoretical framework within 
which much of this research has been conducted is the social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). According to Tajfel and Turner, we derive part of our sense of self from 
   
 
   
 
the social categories (or groups) that we belong to. Through the dual processes of social 
comparison and social categorization we are able to both divide the world into categories, 
position ourselves within them and maintain a sense of positive distinctiveness from 
those we consider not part of ‘us’. Thus, inherent within the theory is an understanding 
that relevant ‘others’, and the construction of social boundaries, play a crucial role in 
constructing an in-group identity. As Elcheroth, Doise & Reicher (2011) argue, “you 
can’t answer ‘which side are you on’ without first knowing what the sides are” (p. 735). 
Theorists within the social identity literature, particularly those focused on national 
identities, have explored how history gives meaning to group identities, providing the 
vital function of creating not only a sharedness between the individual and the group in 
the present, but extending this sense of continuity by rooting it in a seemingly stable and 
essential identity passed on over time and space.  
 
Considering history as a resource for social and collective identities entails understanding 
how history functions to inform the meaning of a group’s identity and to root this 
meaning in the past, linking it to the present and projecting it onto the future. Scholars 
interested in how history informs social identities have explored the importance of 
perceived collective continuity (PCC; Sani et al., 2007) or social representations of 
history provide individuals, as group members, with a sense of positive social esteem and 
in-group attachment. The concept of perceived collective continuity has further been 
divided into two sub-dimensions: essentialism and narrativism. The former is a version of 
continuity achieved through an emphasis on the stability of an in-groups ‘essence’, core 
features such as values, norms and other cultural markers that define and identity, while 
the latter is a version of continuity achieved through interlinking historical events to 
create a consistent narrative of a group’s history. Considering the role of continuity in 
maintaining a sense of positive attachment to the in-group, perceptions of discontinuity 
have been found to cause collective angst over the potential loss of a group’s values, 
norms and traditions (Jetten & Wohl, 2012). Yet a recent strand of research has criticized 
this distinction between continuity as positive and discontinuity as negative by arguing 
that the importance of continuity to the past depends on the valence of the past (Roth, 
Huber, Juenger & Liu, 2017). Namely, if the history of an in-group is seen as negative, 
then historical continuity becomes increasingly threatening to an in-group’s identity and 
historical discontinuity becomes preferred in order to relieve people in the present from 
the burden of a negative past. In other words, depending on how the past is remembered, 
whether positively or negatively, perceived continuity could either become a source of 
positive identification or a threat to the seemingly positive in-group identity of the 
present. This more critical perspective on historical continuity echoes the distinction 
made between essentialist and narrativist continuity, where the former has been found to 
be more likely to satisfy an individual’s need for self-continuity and therefore more likely 
   
 
   
 
to enhance in-group identification, or protect it when threatened (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 
2014).  
If history is such a powerful resource for giving meaning and continuity to an in-group 
identity then we must also acknowledge that those who can shape and re-write history 
will be in a position of power to not only shape who ‘we’ are, but also what we should 
remember of the past and the consequences this has for how we relate to others in the 
present. Research on how political leaders and activists draw on the past to legitimize 
their political goals has been crucial in giving us insights into the mobilizing power of 
historical claims and narratives (Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Klein & Licata, 2003, Obradovic 
& Howarth, 2018; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The importance of understanding how 
history is both malleable and powerful leads us to the third and final conceptualization of 
history, namely as a process of sense making, intimately linked with the ideas and tools 
available to us in the present.  
History as sense making 
The third main conceptualisation of collective memory that has marked psychological 
research has considered discourses on the past to be the product of sense-making 
processes. This idea stems from the works of Frederic Bartlett on memory (1932), who 
proposed to understand memory as a form of action, rather than as a static account of the 
past. In particular, Bartlett believed that the aim of memory is not to accurately reproduce 
the past, but to adaptively act – or react – to the present. One important aspect of this 
process, for Bartlett, is that accounts of the past are created in an ‘effort after meaning’ – 
they are an attempt at making sense of the past – through the use of cultural means, such 
as narratives.  
While much of memory research has claimed to follow the footsteps of Bartlett, it has 
often overlooked its semiotic aspects (Wagoner, 2017). One of the exceptions to this case 
is represented by the narrative approaches to collective memory, which have a double 
origin. First, they are the result of the translation to collective memory research of the 
works of cultural psychologists such as Bruner, who has argued for the importance of 
narrative reasoning as a form of thinking and as a way to give sense to the world in which 
we live (Bruner, 1987, 1991). Second, they are the product of the emerging interest for 
narratives in autobiographical memory research (e.g., McAdams, 1988, Nelson, 2006), 
where the ‘narratisation’ of one’s past came to be seen as the trademark of 
autobiographical processes, allowing one to develop both a sense of continuity over time 
and a sense of identity by giving meaning to one’s past.  
To a certain extent, then, narrative approaches to collective memory consider that 
discourses on the national past constitute the autobiography of a nation, and play a 
similar role as autobiographical memory does, at the collective level. Many of their 
   
 
   
 
tenants have also argued that individual and collective memory are one and only one 
psychological phenomena, and that memory doesn’t just take the form of narratives, it is  
narratives (e.g., Brockmeier, 2002). 
More generally, from a narrative perspective, collective memory is a construction – and 
thus often described as ‘collective remembering’, for reasons similar to discursive 
psychology – mediated by the use of social and cultural tools, that allow us to tell stories 
about the past and give it meaning (e.g., Wertsch, 2002). In other words, social and 
cultural contexts provide us with tools to construct stories, in the form of narrative 
templates (Wertsch, 2008) – broad story lines shared within a given context, such as the 
used and abused stories in many Hollywood action movies or romantic comedies – but 
also of symbols and concepts, that is general meanings and ideas that be applied to the 
past, such as freedom, victimhood, or even the idea of a past ‘Golden Age’.  
While narrative approaches have insisted on the importance of narrative constructions – 
unsurprisingly – others have argued that this is only one of the ways in which the past is 
accounted for and given meaning (e.g., de Saint-Laurent, 2018a). Narratives allow us to 
organise the past into a (more or less) chronological, logical, and meaningful discourse, 
indeed, but it is not the only way we use the past and construct it: Analogies (e.g., 
Spellman & Holyoak, 1992), imagination (e.g., Zittoun, 2017), and argumentation (e.g., 
Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993) are some of the many processes one may use to 
understand, account for, and mobilise the past (de Saint-Laurent, 2018a). In other words, 
collective memory can be conceived, in a more general manner, as a process of 
semiotisation of the past, relying on a myriad of cultural tools and psychological 
processes (de Saint-Laurent, 2018a), in a way similar to what Bartlett originally proposed 
(Wagoner, 2017).  
Common to both narrative and more broadly semiotic approaches to collective memory, 
however, is the idea that if the past is always given meaning from the perspective of the 
present, may it be to help one chose a course of action, to position oneself within the 
social field, or to imagine what may come next. Moreover, it is reconstructed by using the 
tools and resources one has available in the present. In a sense, then, talking about the 
past always involves a form of forecasting or foreshadowing: the present is anticipated in 
the past because it is its aim to explain and give meaning to the present. More 
fundamentally, semiotic resources are flexible tools that can adapt to a plethora of issues 
(Zittoun, 2006) and that are transformed by their uses (de Saint-Laurent, 2014). Thus, it is 
not just the past that gives meaning to the present, but also the present that gives meaning 
to the past, by defining which resources can be used, how, and for what purposes.  
   
 
   
 
History as prospective and transformative 
In the previous three sections, we have offered a brief overview of the main ways in 
which collective memory has been conceptualised in psychology, and what it implies for 
how the past is used for the present. While the different theories presented provide at 
times a contrasted, at others a complementary picture of these processes, two main 
relations between past and present can be said to be found in the literature. On the one 
hand, social representation theory and semiotic approaches conceptualise the past as a 
source of meanings for the present, in which current issues can be anchored to be better 
grasped. On the other hand, discursive approaches and social identity theory tend to 
understand discourses on the past as a way to position oneself within the social field, as 
member of certain social group or as defending a certain vision of history.  
These two conceptualisations are certainly not incompatible, and our aim in this last 
section is certainly not to pick a side of the debate or propose an alternative. On the 
contrary, we consider that these are only two of the ways in which the past is used as a 
resource for the present, and would like to propose a third understanding of the relation 
between past and present, which considers collective memory to be both prospective and 
transformative.  
The prospective function of memory – its ability to help us imagine what may come next 
– has long been recognised as the most important purpose of autobiographical memory 
(e.g., Dudai & Carruthers, 2005), but collective memory research has yet to catch up 
(Merck et al., 2016). There has been, however, a few exceptions: Bresco de Luna (2018), 
for instance, has used the concept of prolepsis to argue that historical narratives are 
structured to anticipate what will come in the future, and we have argued elsewhere (de 
Saint-Laurent, 2018b) that collective memory is characterised by ‘temporal heteroglossia’ 
– the simultaneous presence of multiple periods of time – and that it is by considering 
together past, present, and future that representations of history are constituted. From 
these perspectives, the past is used not just to give meaning to the present, but also to the 
future. By using narrative continuity (in the case of prolepsis) or by contrasting or 
comparing different periods of time (in the case of temporal heteroglossia), we become 
able to understand the present not just in light of the past, but also of the future. While 
past events can give meaning to the present situation, anticipating the future can give it 
significance, by allowing us to imagine what may or may not matter down the line (de 
Saint-Laurent, Obradovic & Carriere, 2018). And because our imagination of the future is 
based on our representations of the past (Vygotsky, 2004), this is an indirect use of 
collective memory for the present.  
Being able to imagine what may come next does not just matter for the significance it 
gives to the present, however. At a very pragmatic level, anticipation allows us to act in 
present: by imagining what may be the consequences of what is currently going on, we 
can adapt our behaviours, in an attempt to prepare for what we believe the future has in 
   
 
   
 
store. More importantly, when anticipating an undesirable future, we can act to try to 
prevent it from happening (Glaveanu, 2018). An example of this has been the reaction of 
many American activists to the election of Donald Trump, who in anticipation of a future 
where their rights and those of minorities would be limited tried to mobilise themselves 
from the very start of his presidency. This anticipation was fuelled by references to World 
War II: because many in the 1930’s did not foresee what the election of Hitler would lead 
to, they remained passive until it was too late, a mistake that decidedly should be avoided 
in the present. In that sense, then, collective memory can be used to transform the 
present, encouraging people to try to alter what they perceive to be the course of history 
(de Saint-Laurent, 2018b).  
Conclusion  
What are the links between the past, present and future, and why does this matter for 
psychology? As we have argued in this article, history can serve as a powerful resource to 
provide meaning, contexts and belonging in diverse social and political settings. The 
purpose of this introduction has been to bring together some of the vast literatures which 
draw on history as a resource for the present through emphasizing the role of history in 
shaping how we think about the world, position ourselves within it, and creatively re-
negotiate the meanings of both the past, present and future. The present article has 
attempted to outline how, why and with what results history functions as a resource in the 
present, and the important ways in which history is both prospective and transformative. 
The articles featured in this special issues address these issues in their own unique ways, 
highlighting the pervasiveness of the links between history and psychology across social, 
national and even disciplinary contexts.   
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